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Abstract—Conventional approaches for ensuring the security
of application software at run-time, through monitoring, either
produce (high rates of) false alarms (e.g. intrusion detection
systems) or limit application performance (e.g. run-time veri-
fication). We present a run-time security monitor that detects
both known and unknown cyber attacks by checking that the
run-time behavior of the application is consistent with the
expected behavior modeled in application specification. This is
crucial because, even if the implementation is consistent with
its specification, the application may still be vulnerable due to
flaws in the supporting infrastructure (e.g. the language run-
time system, supporting libraries and the operating system). This
run-time security monitor is sound and complete, eliminating
false alarms, as well as efficient, so that it does not limit run-
time application performance and so that it supports real-time
systems. Importantly, this monitor is readily applicable to both
legacy and new system platforms.
The security monitor takes as input the application spec-
ification and the application implementation, which may be
expressed in different languages. The specification language of
the application software is formalized based on monadic second
order logic (i.e. first order logic and set theory) and event calculus
interpreted over algebraic data structures. This language allows
us to express behavior of an application at any desired (and
practical) level of abstraction as well as with high degree of
modularity. The security monitor detects every attack by sys-
tematically comparing the application execution and specification
behaviors at runtime, even though they operate at two different
levels of abstraction. We define the denotational semantics of the
specification language and prove that the monitor is sound and
complete, i.e. if the application is consistent with its specification,
the security monitor will produce no false alarms (soundness)
and that it will detect any deviation of the application from the
behavior sanctioned by the specification language (completeness).
Furthermore, the monitor is efficient because of the modular
application specification at appropriate level(s) of abstraction.
Importantly, the application specification language enables the
description of known or potential attack plans, enabling not
only attack detection but attack characterization as well and,
thus, facilitating effective and efficient defenses to sophisticated
attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Runtime security monitors are components of defending
systems against cyber attacks and must provide fast and ac-
curate detection of attacks. Conventional run-time monitoring
systems suffer from high false alarm rates, for both positive
and negative alarms, and are inefficient because their typical
amount of observed parameters is large and possibly irrelevant
to a number of attacks. There are two key reasons for these
limitations: first, the systems do not “understand” the complete
behavior of the system they are protecting, and second, the
Fig. 1. Classification of Runtime Security Monitoring Systems
systems do not “understand” what an attacker is trying to
achieve. Actually, most such systems are retrospective, taking
into account and analyzing historical data, resulting to attack
surface signatures of previous attacks and attempting to iden-
tify the same signature(s) in new traffic. Thus, conventional
run-time monitors are passive, waiting for (and expecting that)
something similar to what has already happened to recur.
Attackers, of course, respond by varying their attacks so as
to avoid detection.
There are two dimensions along which run-time monitoring
systems for security can be classified. The first one is the
behavior description method, i.e. profile-based or model-based.
The second one is the behavior comparison method, i.e.
matching to bad behavior or deviation from good behavior.
This classification approach leads to four classes, as shown
in Figure 1, which include existing techniques and systems,
each with its own strengths and weaknesses. Profile-based
systems that detect attacks by matching with bad behavior
(Class 1 in the figure) typically employ statistical and machine
learning methods to build a profile of bad behavior of the
systems and more specifically, build statistical profiles of
attacks (e.g., [27], [28]). These systems are more robust than
model based systems, since the machine learning techniques
tend to generalize from the data presented. However, they
do not provide rich diagnostic information and suffer from
false alarms. Alternatively, profile-based systems that detect
deviation from good behavior (Class 3 in the figure) typically
build a statistical profile of normal (good) behavior and detect
deviations from this profile (e.g. [25], [26]). Such anomaly
detectors are even more robust than Class 1 systems, because
they do not depend on historical knowledge of the form of
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an attack. However, they have a significant false alarm rate,
because they have limited diagnostic information: when a
deviation is detected, the known information about it is that
something out of the ordinary has happened, but there is no
sufficient information whether this is malicious, accidental or
just a variation of the normal behavior beyond the statistically
accepted profile.
Model-based systems (Classes 2 and 4 in Figure 1) are pop-
ular in highly secure environments, where successful attacks
cause significantly high costs. Signature-based systems are a
typical example in this class (e.g. [23], [24]), and they look
for matches to bad behavior, i.e. they are systems in Class 2.
The advantage of such systems is that, when a match occurs,
i.e. an attack is detected, the systems have enough diagnostic
information available to ”understand” what the failure has
been. However, they lack robustness, since they will fail to
detect an attack, if they have no model of it; thus, they are
susceptible to zero-day attacks and, in general, attacks they
have not been trained for. Finally, model-based systems that
employ run-time software verification to detect deviation from
good behavior fall in Class 4 of the figure. These systems
model the good behavior of a system (e.g. [29], [30]) and
detect deviations from that behavior using run-time software
verification techniques. Their advantage is that, whenever
the system execution deviates from good behavior, there is
knowledge of the exact problem that led to the deviation
(i.e. the offending instruction or routine). However, such ver-
ification methods (a) require adequate design/implementation
information of the system to operate (which is usually not
the case for legacy systems) and (b) limit run-time system
performance, with high impact on real-time systems, such as
industrial control systems (ICS).
Our run-time security monitor falls in Class 4, because it
(a) models normal (good) behavior of the system through
a formal specification description and (b) raises an alarm
when the behavior of the application’s execution deviates
from the behavior described in the (executable) specification.
Specifically, our security monitor has an active model of
normal behavior, namely an executable specification of the
application [3]. This executable specification consists of a
decomposition into sub-modules and pre- and post-conditions
and invariant for each sub-module. In addition, data-flow and
control-flow links connect the sub-modules, specifying the
expected flow of values and of control. The pre- and post-
conditions and invariant are arbitrary first-order statements
about the set of data values (that flow into and out of the sub-
modules) and about other arbitrary constraints respectively.
Our run-time security monitor is suitable not only for
new systems, which derive application implementation from
application specification, but also for ”legacy” systems, where
application implementations exist without adequate (formal or
informal) application specifications. This can be achieved by
describing application specification at any feasible level of
abstraction through available specification information. Fur-
thermore, modular application specification at any desired
level of abstraction also allows us to monitor only attack(s)
specific behavior of ”real-time” systems without affecting their
performance at run-time. As our run-time security monitor is
using an executable application specification, it is efficient for
use in real-time system as has been proven for real-time safety-
critical systems [31].
Our run-time security monitor (“RSM”), shown in Figure 2,
is the core component of a larger system named ARMET.
ARMET takes as input a specification (“AppSpec”) and an
implementation (”AppImpl”) of the application of interest.
Based on the specification, the “Wrapper Synthesizer” of
ARMET generates probes to observe the run-time behavior of
the application that corresponds to the specification elements.
During execution of the “AppImpl”, the RSM checks whether
the actual behavior of the system (observations generated
by ”Wrapper Synthesizer”) is consistent with the predictions
generated from ”AppSpec”. If an inconsistency is detected,
RSM raises an alarm and ARMET suspends the application
execution and proceeds to diagnosis, in order to identify why
the execution of ”AppImpl” did not behave as predicted. In
addition to run-time monitoring, ARMET employs diagnostic
reasoning techniques to further isolate and characterize the
failure [11]. ARMET is highly robust and has high diagnostic
data resolution, which is a key requirement of real-time sys-
tems that require continuous operation even after a successful
attack. ARMET achieves continuous operation through the
construction of a far more complex models of applications.
RSM runs executable application specification in parallel
with the actual application code, comparing their results at the
granularity and abstraction level of the executable specifica-
tion. The executable specification is hierarchical and modular,
allowing flexibility in the granularity of the monitoring. De-
pending on the environment, the executable specification may
run at a high level of abstraction, incurring less overhead,
but requiring more diagnostic reasoning when the program
diverges from the behavior of the executable specification.
Alternatively, the executable specification can be elaborated
in greater detail, incurring more overhead, but providing more
containment.
Optionally, the model can also specify suspected incorrect
behaviors of a component and associated potential attack
plans, allowing the diagnostic reasoning to characterize the
way in which a component may have misbehaved. Then, diag-
nosis is a selection of behavioral modes for each component
of the specification, such that the specification predicts the
observed misbehavior of the system.
Through this work, we introduce a highly reliable run-
time security monitor with proven absence of false alarms
(i.e. soundness and completeness). Importantly, the proof
establishes a contract between the monitor and its user such
that, if the user establishes the assumptions of the proof, the
monitor guarantees to detect any violation at run-time.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe related work and in Section III we
present the calculus (syntax and semantics) of the application
specification language. In Section IV, we first present the
calculus of the security monitor and then we present the
formulation and proof of soundness and completeness of the
Fig. 2. The Architecture of Core Defending-System
monitor. We conclude in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
The operation of RSM is to check the consistency between
the specified and execution behaviors of an application at run-
time. This may be viewed as a run-time verification problem.
The goal of run-time verification is to specify the intended
behavior of a system in some formalism and to generate an
executable monitor from this formalism (i.e. specification) that
reports inconsistent execution, if detected.
There has been extensive research on specification based
run-time monitoring. Most such approaches employ formalism
such as context grammars, regular expressions [13], event cal-
culus [10], temporal logic [7], [6] and rule systems operating
over atomic formulas [9]. Such formalism offer limited expres-
sive power to formalize complex system properties, although
they can be translated into efficient executable monitors. To ad-
dresses the challenges of run-time monitoring of ”legacy” and
”real-time” systems (namely the lack of design information
and performance respectively), our formalism allows not only
to specify dependencies, system level behavior and security
properties (in case of partial design details), but also to specify
internal system behavior and complex security properties (in
case of desired design details) of such systems as well.
Run-time monitoring of legacy systems has not received
significant attention. However, there have been attempts to
apply similar monitoring techniques. For example, Kaiser et
al. instrument the systems by probing and passing data to
another component that forms a basis of the system’s model
which is later used to monitor run-time modifications automat-
ically [15]. More recently, Wofgang et al. have automatically
generated run-time monitor for network traffic from a high-
level specification language which is based on first order
predicate logic and set theory [14]. Furthermore, based on a
variant of denotational semantics of the specification language
and operational semantics of the monitor [17], they verified
soundness of the resource analysis of the monitor [16]. The
resource analysis identifies the number of instances of the
monitor and the number of messages required to detect a
violation.
Model-based executable specifications have been rarely used
for run-time monitoring of real-time systems [18]. However,
Barnett et al. have used ASML as an executable specification
language for run-time monitoring [19]. ASML is an extension
of ASM, which is based on the formalism of a transition sys-
tem whose states are first order algebras [4]. There is no formal
semantics of ASML, however, the operational semantics of
some constructs of ASM has been defined by Hannan et al. [5].
More recently, Choilko et al. have developed a framework for
executable specification based run-time monitoring of timed
systems [21]. In this work, the formalism of the specification
is based on an extended time interval which is a pair of a time
event and a time interval. The formalism for implementation
is based on timed word which is a sequence of time events
and the goal of the monitor is to check the conformance of an
implementation word and the specification trace.
In contrast to the approaches discussed above, the focus
of our run-time security monitor is to check consistency
of automatically generated predictions (conditions) from an
executable specification language and run-time observations
of application execution. The formalism of our specification
language is based on monadic second order logic [20] and
event calculus interpreted over algebraic data structures. This
formalism allows specification of faulty behaviors of a sys-
tem. Furthermore, the formalism enables description of attack
plans, which are exploited by the monitor at run-time for
early threat detection against more sophisticated and complex
attacks, e.g. advanced persistent threats. Our formalism is
similar to Crash Hoare-logic that is used to capture the faulty
behavior of a file system [22]. Our formalism allows sound
construction (resp. specification) of high-level abstract behav-
ior of a system from low-level abstract behavior(s) using a
method analogous to classical set builder. Our security monitor
is the first approach in run-time monitoring that formally
assures the absence of false alarms and thus is sound and
complete. For our proof we use the denotational semantics of
the application specification language as described in [2].
III. APPLICATION SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
Our executable (application) specification language [3] con-
sists of a decomposition of an application behavior into sub-
modules and pre- and post-conditions and invariant (behav-
ioral description) for each sub-module: in rest of the paper,
we use the term system for application behavior. The decom-
position is further equipped with data-flow and control-flow
links that connect the sub-modules, specifying the expected
flow of values and of control. The specification also allows
to specify potential attack plans for the components based on
attack models and associated rules that imply a certain attack
model.
In the following subsection, we discuss selected high level
syntactic domains and their semantics.
A. Syntax
Based on the aforementioned description, syntactically, the
specification language (represented by syntactic domain ω) has
following three main top level constructs:
1) hierarchical decomposition (ζ) of sub-modules,
2) behavioral description (η) of each sub-module and
3) attack plans () of modules/sub-modules.
The simplified grammar of these top level domains is shown
in Figure 3.
Application Specification ω ::= ... ζ η ...
Decomposition ζ ::= α | (α) ζ
Behavioral Model η ::= β | (β) η
Attack Plan  ::= δ ρ | (δ ρ) 
...
Fig. 3. Top Level Syntactic Domains of the Language
In the following we briefly discuss the decomposition and
attack plans, and will focus more on behavioral description,
being core and the only one that is also used in the following
sections for semantics and proof.
Decomposition (α): The hierarchical decomposition α of a
component1 consists of
1) its interface
• sets of inputs and outputs respectively
• a set of the resources used by the component
(e.g. files, binary code, ports) and a set of sub-
components
• sets of events that allow entry and exit to and from
the component respectively
• a set of events that are allowed to occur during the
execution of the component
• a set of conditional probabilities between the possi-
ble modes of the resources and the possible modes
of the component and a set of known vulnerabilities
occurred to the component
2) and a structural model that is a set of sub-components
some of that might be splits or joins of
• data-flows between linking ports of the sub-
components and
• control-flow links between cases of a branch and
a component that will be enabled if that branch is
taken
The syntactical domain α is defined in Figure 4.
The elements of α are informally discussed above. Further
details of α are out of the scope of this paper.
Behavioral Description (β): The β describes normal (and
optionally various compromised) behavior of a component that
includes
• set of inputs and outputs respectively,
• allowable events during the execution in that mode and
• preconditions on the inputs, post-conditions and invariant,
all of that are first order logical expressions.
The complete syntax of β is defined in Figure 5.
1The ”component” and ”module/sub-module” are used interchangeably.
α ::= define-ensemble CompName
:entry-events :auto | set(Evnt)
:exit-events set(Evnt)
:allowable-events set(Evnt)
:inputs set(ObjName)
:outputs set(ObjName)
:components set(Comp)
:controlflows set(CtrlFlow)
:splits set(SpltCF)
:joins set(JoinCF)
:dataflows set(DataFlow)
:resources set(Res)
:resource-mapping set(ResMap)
:model-mappings set(ModMap)
:vulnerabilities set(Vulnrablty)
Fig. 4. Syntactic Domain for Decomposition (α)
β ::= defbehavior-model (CompName normal | compromised)
:inputs set(ObjName)
:outputs set(ObjName)
:allowable-events set(Evnt)
:prerequisites set(BehCond)
:postconditions set(BehCond)
:invariant set(BehCond)
Fig. 5. Syntactic Domain for Behavioral Description (β)
Attack Plan (): The attack plan  consists of a description
of potential attack models (δ) and the rules (ρ) that imply a
certain attack. Syntactically, an attack plan includes
• a set of types of attacks that are being anticipated and
the prior probability of each of them,
• a set of effects such that how each attack type can effect
mode (normal/compromised) of a resource and
• a set of rules expressing the conditional probabilities
between attack types and resource modes.
The syntactic domains of δ and ρ are defined in Figure 6
resp.
In principle, attack plans are hypothetical attacks based
on rules that describe different ways of compromising a
component. The monitor exploits such plans to match at run-
time and detect any such attack, thus making the monitor more
robust.
δ ::= define-attack-model AtkModName
:attack-types (set(AtkType))
:vulnerability-mapping (set(AtkVulnrabltyMap))
ρ ::= defrule AtkRulName (:forward)
if set(AtkCond) then set(AtkCons)
Fig. 6. Syntactic Domains of Attack Model (δ) and Rule (ρ)
B. Example
To provide an intuitive grounding for these ideas we will
consider an example of a simple ICS and of its model in the
specification language. The system consists of a water tank,
a level sensor and a pump that is capable of either filling or
draining the tank. The tank has a natural leakage rate that is
proportional to the height of the water column in the tank. The
tank is controlled by a PID controller; this is a computational
device running a standard (PID) control algorithm that has a
simple structure:
The algorithm has two inputs: The set-point, i.e. the water
level that the tank should maintain and the sensor value
provide by the level sensor. It has a simple output, the
command. The algorithm performs the following computations
based on the three parameters notated as Kp, Ki and Kd that are
used as scaling weights in the algorithm as shown in Figure 9
(a).
1) Calculate the error, the difference between the set-point
and the sensor value
2) Calculate three terms:
a) The Proportional term; this is just the error
weighted by Kp.
b) The Integral term; this is a running sum of the
errors seen so far, weighted by Ki.
c) The Derivative term; this is a local estimate of rate
of change of the sensor value, weighted by Kd.
3) Calculate the sum of the three terms.
4) The value of the sum is the command output of the
algorithm.
The command output of the algorithm is sent to the pump,
controlling the rate at which the pump either adds or removes
water. The algorithm is “tuned” by the choice of the three
parameters Kp, Ki and Kd; when well tuned the system
responds quickly to deviations from the set-point with little
over-shoot and very small oscillations around the set-point.
Finally, we note that the level sensor can be viewed as
(and often is) a computational and communication device that
estimates the actual height of the water tank and communicates
the estimated height back to the controller.
There are two standard categories of attacks on such a
system:
• False Data Injection Attacks. These are attacks on
the sensor and its communication channel, such that the
controller receives a value that is different from the actual
level of the tank.
• Controller Attacks. These are penetrations to the com-
puter running the control algorithm. For our purposes it
is only necessary to consider attacks that overwrite the
value of one of Kp, Ki, or Kd. Any such attack, will
cause the controller to calculate an incorrect command.
In either case, the end result is that the level in the water
tank will not be correctly maintained. In the first case, the
controller calculates a correct response to the distorted sensor
value. For example, suppose that the attacker is systematically
distorting the sensor value to be too low. In that case, the
controller will continuously issue commands to the pump to
add water to the tank, eventually causing the tank to overflow.
In the second case, a change in value of one of the controller
parameters will cause the controller to calculate in an incorrect
command. This can have a variety of effects, depending on
which parameters are changed.
Monitoring of such a system requires its behavioral spec-
ification as shown in Figure 9 (b). The actual system is a
cyber-physical system, containing both physical components
(i.e. the tank, the pump) and computational components (i.e.
the controller and the sensor). The monitor model parallels this
structure; it contains computational models of the controller
and the sensor as well as a computational model of the physical
plant. This later model performs a numerical integration of the
differential equations describing the physical plant’s behavior,
e.g. the dynamics of the pump. The application specification
of the controller, essentially mirrors the structure of the
algorithm: There is a component that calculates the error term,
data-flow links that connect the error term to each of three
parallel steps that calculate the Proporational, Integral and
Derivative terms, finally there is the summation component
that adds the three terms, calculating the command output.
The structural model of the controller is shown diagram-
matically in Figure 9 (b) (N and C refers to normal and
compromised behavior and A refers to possible attacks). The
models for the components of the controller are reasonably
straightforward. For example, the normal behavioral model for
the Kd calculation states that the output of the component is
the derivative of the error, weighted by Kd. This is expressed
as a post-condition, as shown in Figure 8.
Notice that what the controller calculates is a discrete
approximation of the derivative of the error term, which is
calculated using the previous and current versions of the error.
The value of the error term is conceptually a state variable
that is updated between successive iterations of the controller
computation. In our specification language, however, we model
these as extra inputs and data flows (as we do also for control
algorithm parameters such as Kd). For simplicity, we have
omitted these extra items from the diagram in Figure 9.
The compromised behavioral model states that any other
behavior is acceptable; it does so by stating no post-conditions.
The run-time behavior of the monitor will depend on the
strength of the post-conditions; if these are too weak, the
monitor may allow undesired behaviors..
C. Formal Semantics
In this section, we first give the definition of semantic
algebras, then discuss informal description and the formal
denotational semantics of the core construct (i.e. behavioral
description) of the specification language.
1) Semantic Algebras: Semantic domains1 2 represent a set
of elements that share some common properties. A semantic
1These domains are common to a program to be monitored, its specification
language and the monitor.
2We use subscript s and r to specify domains for specification and
program’s runtime resp., e.g. States = specification state, Stater = program’s
runtime state, State = combined monitor state.
(define-component-type controller-step
:entry-events (controller-step)
:exit-events (controller-step)
:allowable-events (update-state accum-error)
:inputs (set-point sens-val)
:outputs (com)
:components
((err-comp :type err-comp :models (normal))
(comp-der :type comp-der :models (normal)) ... )
:dataflows
((set-point controller-step set-point err-comp)
(the-error err-comp the-error comp-der)...))
Fig. 7. Decomposition of the Module controller-step
(define-component-type comp-der
:entry-events (compute-derivative)
:exit-events (compute-derivative)
:inputs (the-error old-error kd time-step)
:outputs (der-term)
:behavior-modes (normal compromised) )
(defbehavior-model (comp-der normal)
:inputs (the-error the-old-error kd time-step)
:outputs (der-term)
:prerequisites ([data-type-of the-error number])
:post-conditions
([and [data-type-of der-term number]
[equal der-term
(*kd(/(- new-error old-error) time-step))]]))
(defbehavior-model (comp-der compromised)
:inputs (the-error the-old-error kd time-step)
:outputs (der-term)
:prerequisites ()
:post-conditions ())
Fig. 8. Normal and Compromised Behavior of comp-der(kd)
(a)
Application (b) Specification
Fig. 9. A Controller Application and its Model
domain is accompanied by a set of operations as functions
over the domain. A domain and its operations together form
a semantic algebra [8]. The domains of our language are
similar to the domains of any classical programming/speci-
fication language (e.g. Java, JML, ACSL). In the following
we declare/define only important semantic domains and their
operations.
Environment Values: The domain Environment holds the
environment values of the language and is formalized as a
tuple of domains Context (which is a mapping of identifiers
to the environment values) and Space (that models the memory
space). The Environment domain includes interesting values,
e.g. component, attack plan and resource. Here resource can
be binary code in memory, files and ports etc.
Domain: Environment
Environment := Context × Space
Context := Identifier → EnvValue
EnvValue := Variable + Component + AtkPlan + Resource +
...
Space := P(Variable)
Variable := n, where n ∈ N represents locations
The domain Environment supports typical selection, update
and equality operations over its values.
State Values: The domain State represents the execution of
a program. A Store is important element of the state and holds
for every Variable a Value. The Data of the state is a tuple
of a Flag that represents the current status of the state and a
Mode to represent the current mode of execution of the state
of a component.
Domain: State
State := Store × Data
Store := Variable → Value
Data := Flag × Mode
Flag := {running, ready, completed}
Mode := {normal, compromised}
The domain State has typical operations, e.g. read and
write/update of values, checking equality of Flag and Mode in
a given state, and setting a certain Flag and Mode of a given
state.
Semantic Values: Value is a disjunctive union domain and
note that the domain Value is a recursive domain.
Domain: Value
Value := ObsEvent + RTEvent + Component + AtkPlan + ... + Value∗
The domain includes semantic values of observable event, a
run-time event and attack plan etc. The equality of the given
two semantic values can be evaluated.
Component Values: The Component formalizes the seman-
tic model of a component as a predicate over decomposition,
normal and compromised behavior and a pre-state and a post-
state of the component’s execution respectively. The predicate
is formalized as follows:
Component = P(SBehavior × NBehavior × CBehavior ×
State × State⊥3)
3State⊥ = State ∪ {⊥}
where
SBehavior := P(Value∗ × Value∗ × Value∗ × State × State⊥)
NBehavior = CBehavior := P(Value∗ × Value∗ × State × State⊥)
Furthermore, SBehavior is defined as a predicate over sets of
input and output values, set of allowable values, a pre-state
and a post-state of the behavior. Also, normal behavior and
compromised behavior (NBehavior and CBehavior) are also
defined as predicates over sets of input and output values, a
pre-state and a corresponding post-state respectively.
Attack Values: The semantics domain AtkModel formalizes
the attack model and is defined as a predicate over an
attack name, probability of the attack and the corresponding
vulnerability causing the attack; the attack model is formulated
as follows:
AtkModel := P(Identifier × FVal × Vulnerability)
2) Signatures of Valuation Functions: A valuation function
defines a mapping of a language’s abstract syntax structures
to its corresponding meanings (semantic algebras) [8]. The
valuation function operates on a syntactic construct and returns
a function from the environment to a semantic domain.
We define the result of the valuation function as a predicate,
e.g. the behavioral relation (BehRelation) is defined as a
predicate over an environment, a pre- and a post-state and
is defined as follows:
BehRelation := P(Environment × State × State⊥)
The valuation functions for the abstract syntax domains of
specification (ω), behavioral description (β) and attack plans
() have same signatures. For example, a valuation function
signature for β is defined as follows:
[[β]]: Environment → BehRelation
Based on the above relation and the auxiliary semantic
inference rules (see Figure 10), we define valuation functions
for β and  in the following subsection.
3) Definition of Valuation Functions: Semantically, normal
and compromised behavioral models results in modifying the
corresponding elements of the environment value Component
as defined below:
[[β]](e)(e’, s, s’) ⇔
LET c ∈ Component: [[CompName]](e)(s, s’, inValue(c)) IN
∀ e1 ∈ Environment, nseq ∈ set(EvntName), b1, b2: B,
eseq ∈ ObsEvent*, iseq, oseq ∈ Value∗:
[[set(ObjName1)]](e)(s, iseq) ∧ [[set(BehCond1)]](e) (s) ∧
noatk(c, e, b1) ∧ [[set(Evnt)]](e) (e’, s, s’, nseq, eseq) ∧
[[set(ObjName2)]](e’)(s’, oseq) ∧[[set(BehCond2)]](e’)(s,s’)∧
[[set(BehCond3)]](e’) (s, s’) ∧ noatk(c, e’, b2)
⇒
LET v = b1 ∧ b2 ∧ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
update(c, e’, s, s’, iseq, oseq, v)
where update is an auxiliary semantic rule as shown in
Figure 10.
In detail, if the semantics of β in an environment e yields
environment e′ and transforms a pre-state s into a post-state
s′ then
t ∈ {ENTRY, EXIT, ALLOWABLE, NONE}
typeOf(oe, c)→ t
dataArrives(c, s(i), s′(i))
comp(c, e(i), e′(i), s(i), s′(i),False, 0) s(i+1) = s(i)
s′(i+1) = s(i) setMode(s′(i+1), ”compromised”)
run(ENTRY, c, e, e′, s, s′, i, False)
dataArrives(c, s(i), s′(i))
comp(c, e(i), e′(i), s(i), s′(i),True, 0)
setFlag(s′(i+1), ”running”) s(i+1) = s′(i)
e(i+1) = e′(i) cseq = components(c)
mon(cseq, s(i+1), s′(i+1), e(i+1), e′(i+1))
run(ENTRY, c, e, e′, s, s′, i, True)
dataArrives(c, s(i), s′(i)) setFlag(s′(i+1), ”completed”)
comp(c, e(i), e′(i), s(i), s′(i), b, 1)
s(i+1) = s′(i) s′(i+1) = s′(i)
[b = False⇒ setMode(s′(i+1), ”compromised”)]
[b = True⇒ setMode(s′(i+1), ”normal”)]
run(EXIT, c, e, e′, s, s′, i, b)
inv(c, e(i), e′(i), s(i), s′(i), b1)
noatk(c, e(i), b1) s(i+1) = s′(i) e(i+1) = e′(i+1)
run(ALLOWABLE, c, e, e′, s, s′, i, b1 ∧ b2)
setMode(s′(i), ”compromised”
s(i+1) = s′(i) e′(i+1) = e(i+1)
run(NONE, c, e, e′, s, s′, i, Flase)
nbeh = 〈inseq, outseq, s, s′〉
c′ = 〈c[1], nbeh, c[3], s, s′〉
update(c, e1[id(c) 7→ c′], s, s′, inseq, outseq,True)
cbeh = 〈inseq, outseq, s, s′〉 c′ = 〈c[1], c[2], cbeh, s, s′〉
update(c, e1[id(c) 7→ c′], s, s′, inseq, outseq,False)
a = 〈aseq, apseq, vnseq〉
atk(atkName, e, e[atkName 7→ a], aseq, apseq, vnseq)
b = [∀at : AtkName : at = context(e)(AtkName)⇒ notcomp(c, at)]
noatk(c, e, b)
inv(c, e(i), e′(i), s(i), s′(i), b1)
b2 = [x = 0⇒ precond(c, e(i), e′(i), s(i), s′(i),True)]
b3 = [x = 1⇒ postcond(c, e(i), e′(i), s(i), s′(i),True)]
noatk(c, e(i), b4)
comp(c, s, s′, e, e′, b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3 ∧ b4, x)
∃rte arrives(rte, s) monitors(i+1, rte, c, e, e′′, s, s′′)
mon(cseq, s′′, s′, e′′, e′, s′′, s′, i)
mon(c; cseq, s, s′, e, e′, s, s′, i)
Fig. 10. Auxiliary Semantic Inference Rules
• the evaluation of inputs set(ObjName1) yields a set of
values iseq in environment e and state s such that the
pre-conditions set(BehCond1) hold in e and s and the
component c has no potential threat (see rule noatk)
and
• the evaluation of allowable events results in environment
e′ and given post-state s′ with some auxiliary sets nseq
and eseq and
• the evaluation of outputs set(ObjName2) yields a set
of values oseq in e′ and s′ such that post-conditions
set(BehCond2) hold in e1, s and s′ and
• the invariant set(BehCond2) holds in e′, s and s′, and
the component c has no threat (noatk), finally the
environment e′ can be constructed as follows
– if the post-state is “normal” then e′ is an update
to the normal behavior “nbeh” of the component
“CompName”
– otherwise e′ is an update to the compromised be-
havior “cbeh” of the component as shown in the
corresponding inference rules of update.
Moreover, the valuation function for attack plan is defined as:
[[δ]](e)(e’, s, s’) ⇔
∀ s” ∈ State, aseq, aseq’, vnseq ∈ ISeq, apseq ∈ Value∗:
[[set(AtkType)]](e)(s, inState⊥(s”), aseq, apseq) ∧
[[set(AtkVulnrabltyMap)]](e) (s”, s’, aseq’, vnseq) ∧
atk(AtkModName, e, e’, aseq, apseq, vnseq)
In detail, the semantics of the domain “δ” updates the
environment e with a semantic value of AtkPlan such that
if
• in a given e and s, the evaluation of “set(AtkType)”
yields post-state s′′, a set of attack types aseq and a set
of values (conditional probabilities) apseq and also
• in given e and s, the evaluation of
“set(AtkVulnrabltyMap)” yields post-state s′, a
set of attack types aseq′ and a set of vulnerabilities
vnseq, then
• the environment e′ is an update of environment e with
the semantic value AtkPlan, which is a triple of (a) a set
of attack types (b) a set of corresponding probabilities
and (c) a set of vulnerabilities causing the attack types,
respectively.
IV. SECURITY MONITOR
Based on [3], in this section we discuss the informal
behavior of our run-time security monitor whose main goal
is to check consistency between a program’s run-time ob-
servations and its specification-based predictions and to only
raise a flag if any inconsistency is identified. In detail, when
the application implementation starts execution, a “startup”
event is generated and dispatched to the top level component
of the system, which transforms the execution state of the
component into “running” mode. The component instantiates
its subnetwork (i.e. sub-components) and propagates the data
along its data-links by enabling the corresponding control-
links (if involved). When the data arrives on the input port
of the component, the monitor checks if it is complete; if so,
the monitor checks the preconditions of the component for
the data and if they succeed, it transforms the state of the
component into “ready” mode. Should the conditions fail, it
raises a flag.
After the above startup, the execution monitor starts mon-
itoring the arrival of every observation (run-time event) as
follows:
1) If the event is a “method entry”, then the execution
monitor checks if this is one of the “entry events”
of the component in the “ready” state; if so, then
after receiving the data, the respective preconditions,
invariant and absence of attack plans are checked; if
they succeed, then the data is applied on the input port
of the component and the mode of the execution state
is changed to “running”.
2) If the event is a “method exit”, then the execution
monitor checks if this is one of the “exit events” of the
component in the “running” state; if so, it changes its
state into “completed” mode and collects the data from
the output port of the component and checks for the
corresponding postconditions, invariant and absence of
attack plans. Should the checks fail, the monitor raises
an alarm.
3) If the event is one of the “allowable events” of the
component, if invariant holds and there is no attack plan
then it continues execution and finally
4) otherwise, if the event is an none of the above events,
then the monitor raises an alarm.
A. Formal Semantics
Based on the aforementioned description of the execution
monitor, we have formalized the denotational semantics of the
monitor by a relation monitor that is declare and defined as
follows:
monitor ⊆ AppImpl × AppSpec
→ Environment → State × State⊥
monitor(κ, ω)(e)(s, s’) ⇔
∀ c ∈ Component, t, t’ ∈ States, d, d’ ∈ Environments, rte ∈ RTEvent:
[[ω]](d)(d’, t, t’) ∧ [[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ setFlag(s, “running”) ∧
eqMode(s, ”normal”) ∧ arrives(rte, s) ∧ equals(s, t) ∧ equals(er, d)
⇒
∀ p, p’ ∈ Environment*, m, n ∈ State*:
equals(m(0), s) ∧ equals(p(0), er) ∧
∃ k ∈ N:
( ∀ i ∈ Nk: monitors(i, rte, c, p, p’, m, n) ∧ equals(s’, n(k)) ) ∧
[( eqMode(n(k), “normal”) ∨ eqMode(n(k), “compromised”)] ∧
IF eqMode(n(k), “normal”) THEN
eqFlag(n(k), “completed”) ∧ equals(s’, t’)
ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’)
In detail, the predicate says that if we execute specification
(ω) in an arbitrary safe pre-state (s) and environment (d)
and execute program (κ) in an arbitrary pre-state (t s.t. s
equals t) and environment (er s.t. er equals d) then there is a
finite natural number (k) at which monitor can be observed
such that for all iterations until k, the monitor continuous
operation. However, at iteration k, either the monitor is in a
”normal” mode or in a ”compromised” mode. If the mode is
”normal”, then the component under monitoring has finished
its job safely and the post-state of the program execution (t’) is
equal to post-state (t) of the specification execution, otherwise
component is compromised and thus the program execution
state (s’) and specification execution state (t’) are inconsistent.
The core semantics of monitor is captured by an auxiliary
predicate monitors that is defined as a relation on
• the number of observation i w.r.t. of a component,
• an observation (run-time event) rte, component c being
observed,
• sets of pre- and post-environments e and e′ resp. and
• sets of pre- and post-states s and s′ respectively.
The predicate monitors is formalized as follows:
monitors ⊆ N × RTEvent × Component
× Environment∗ × Environment∗
× State∗ × State∗⊥
monitors(i, [[rte]], [[c]], e, e’, s, s’) ⇔
eqMode(s(i), ”completed”)
∨
[ ( eqMode(s(i), “running”) ∨ eqMode(s(i), “ready”) ) ∧
¬ eqMode(s(i), ”compromised”) ∧ [[c]](e(i))(e’(i), s(i), s’(i)) ∧
∃ oe ∈ ObEvent: equals(rte, store([[name(rte)]])(e(i))) ∧
run(type(oe, c), c, e, e’, s, s’, i, eqMode(s’, ”normal”))) ]
In detail, the predicate monitors is defined such that, at any
arbitrary observation either the execution is completed and
returns or the current execution state s(i) of component c is
“ready” or “running” and the current execution state is safe
and behavior of the component c has been evaluated and there
is a run-time event oe that we want to observe (and thus equals
an observation rte) and then any of the following can happen:
• either the prediction resp. observation is an entry event
of the component c, then it waits until the complete data
for c arrives, if so, then
– either the preconditions and the invariant of “normal”
behavior of the component hold and there is no
potential attack for the component (as modeled by
semantic rule comp in Figure 10); if so, then the
subnetwork of the component is initiated and the
sub-components in the subnetwork are monitored
iteratively with the corresponding arrival of the ob-
servation
– or the preconditions and the invariant of “compro-
mised” behavior of the component hold or some
attack plan is detected for the component, in this case
the state is marked to “compromised” and returns
• or the observation is an exit event and after the arrival
of complete data, the post-conditions and the invariant
hold and if there is no potential threat detected, then the
resulting state is marked as “completed”
• or the observation is an allowable event, the invariant
holds and there is no threat for c, then the c continues
the execution
• or the observation is an unexpected event (i.e. none of the
above holds), then the state is marked as “compromised”
and returns.
All of the above choices are modeled by the corresponding
semantic inference rule of run, see Figure 10.
B. Overview of the Soundness
The intent of soundness statement is to articulate whether
the system’s behavior is consistent with the behavioral specifi-
cation. Essentially, the goal here is to show the absence of false
negative alarm such that whenever the security monitor alarms
there is indeed a semantic inconsistency between post-state
of the program execution and post-state of the specification
execution. The soundness theorem is stated as follows:
Theorem 1 (Soundness of security monitor). The result of
the security monitor is sound for any execution of the target
system and its specification, iff, the specification is consistent4
with the program and the program executes in a safe pre-state
and in an environment that is consistent with the environment
of the specification, then
• for the pre-state of the program, there is an equivalent
safe pre-state for which the specification can be executed
and the monitor can be observed and
• if we execute the specification in an equivalent safe pre-
state and observe the monitor at any arbitrary (combined)
post-state, then
– either there is no alarm, and then the post-state is
safe and the program execution (post-state) is se-
mantically consistent with the specification execution
(post-state)
– or there is an alarm, and then the post-state is
compromised and the program execution (post-state)
and the specification execution (post-state) are se-
mantically inconsistent.
Formally, soundness theorem has the following signatures
and definition.
Soundness ad ⊆ P(AppImpl × AppSpec × Bool)
Soundness ad(κ, ω, b) ⇔
∀ es ∈ Environments, er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, s, s’ ∈ Stater:
consistent(es, er) ∧ consistent(κ, ω) ∧
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
⇒
∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[ω]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, ω)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[ω]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, ω)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
LET b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
IF b = True THEN equals(s’, t’) ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’) (G)
In detail, the soundness statement says that, if
1) a specification environment (es) is consistent with a run-
time environment (er) and
2) a target system (κ) is consistent with its specification
(ω) and
4See definition of the corresponding predicate consistent in § IV-E.
3) in a given run-time environment (er), execution of the
system (κ) transforms pre-state (s) into a post-state (s’)
and
4) the pre-state (s) is safe, i.e. the state is in ”normal” mode,
then
• there is such pre- and post-states (t and t’ respectively)
and environment (es’) of the specification execution such
that in a given specification environment (es), execution
of the specification (ω) transforms pre-state (t) into a post-
state (t’) and
• the pre-states s and t are equal and monitoring of the
system (κ) transforms combined pre-state (s;t) into a
combined post-state (s’;t’) and if
• in a given specification environment (es), execution of the
specification (ω) transforms pre-state (t) into a post-state
(t’) and
• the pre-states s and t are equal and monitoring of the
system (κ) transforms pre-state (s) into a post-state (s’)
then
– either there is no alarm (b is True) and then the
post-state s’ of program execution is safe and the
resulting states s’ and t’ are semantically equal
– or the security monitor alarms (b is False) and then
the post-state s’ of program execution is compro-
mised and the resulting states s’ and t’ are semanti-
cally not equal.
In the following section we present proof of the soundness
statement.
C. Proof of the Soundness
The proof is essentially a structural induction on the el-
ements of the specification (ω) of the system (κ). We have
proved only interesting case β of the specification to show
that the proof works in principle. However, the proof of the
remaining parts can easily be rehearsed following the similar
approach.
The proof is based on certain lemmas (see subsection IV-F),
which are about the relations between different elements of
the system and its specification (being at different levels
of abstraction). These lemmas and relations can be proved
based on the defined auxiliary functions and predicates (see
subsection IV-E) that are based on the method suggested by
Hoare [1].
In the following, we start proof with induction on η.
1) Case (η): We can re-write (G) as
Soundness ad(κ, η, b) ⇔
∀ es ∈ Environments, er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, s, s’ ∈ Stater:
consistent(es, er) ∧ consistent(κ, η) ∧
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
⇒
∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[η]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, η)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[η]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, η)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
LET b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
IF b = True THEN equals(s’, t’)
ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’) (G-1)
Here, we have two syntactic cases for η but we will show
only one case in the following subsection.
2) Case when η = β: We can re-write (G-1) as
Soundness ad(κ, β, b) ⇔
∀ es ∈ Environments, er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, s, s’ ∈ Stater:
consistent(es, er) ∧ consistent(κ, β) ∧
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
⇒
∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
LET b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
IF b = True THEN equals(s’, t’)
ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’) (F.1)
From (F.1), we know
• consistent(es, er) (1)
• consistent(κ, β) (2)
• [[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) (3)
• eqMode(s, ”normal”) (4)
We show
• ∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments: equals(s, t) ∧
[[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) (G-1.1)
• ∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments: equals(s, t) ∧
[[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
LET b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
IF b = True THEN equals(s’, t’)
ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’) (G-1.2)
Goal: G-1.1: We split the goal (G-1.1) into following three
sub-goals:
equals(s, t) (G-1.1.1)
[[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) (G-1.1.2)
monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) (G-1.1.3)
Sub-Goal: G-1.1.1: We define
t := constructs(s, β) (5)
We instantiate Lemma (1) with s as s, t as t, ω as β to get
t := constructs(s, β) ⇒ equals(s, t) (I.1)
The goal (G-1.1.1) follows from (I.1) and definition (5). 
Sub-Goal: G-1.1.2: We expand definition (2) and get
∀ m, m’ ∈ State, n, n’ ∈ Environment:
[[κ]](n)(n’, m, m’) ∧ eqMode(m, ”normal)
⇒ [[β]](n)(n’, m, m’) (F.2)
We instantiate formula (F.2) with m as s;t, m’ as s’;t’, n as
er;es’, n’ as er’;s’ and κ with κ to get
[[κ]](er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) ∧ eqMode(s;t, ”normal”)
⇒ [[β]](er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) (I.2)
We instantiate Lemma (4) with s as s, s’ as s’, t as t, t’ as t’,
er as er, er’ as er’, es as es, es’ as es’, κ as κ and get
[[κ]](er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) ⇔ [[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) (I.3)
We instantiate Lemma (6) with s as s, t as t, t’ and get
eqMode(s;t, ”normal”) ⇔ eqMode(s, ”normal”) (I.4)
From (I.2) with assumptions (3), (4), (I.3) and (I.4) we get
[[β]](er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) (I.2’)
We instantiate Lemma (5) with s as s, s’ as s’, t as t, t’ as t’,
er as er, er’ as er’, es as es, es’ as es’, ω as β and get
[[β]](er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) ⇔ [[β]](er)(er’, s, s’) (I.5)
The goal (G-1.1.2) follows from (I.5) with assumption (I.2’)..
Sub-Goal: G-1.1.3: We instantiate induction assumption (on
η) with κ as κ, ω as β, b as b to get
∀ es ∈ Environments, er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, s, s’ ∈ Stater:
consistent(es, er) ∧ consistent(κ, β) ∧
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
⇒
∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
LET b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
IF b = True THEN equals(s’, t’)
ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’) (I.6)
We instantiate (I.6) with es as es, es’ as es’, er as er, er’ as
er’, s as s, s’ as s’ to get
consistent(es, er) ∧ consistent(κ, β) ∧
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
⇒
∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
LET b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
IF b = True THEN equals(s’, t’)
ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’) (I.6.1)
The goal (G-1.1.3) follows from (I.6.1) with assumptions (1),
(2), (3), (4). Hence goal (G-1.1) is proved. 
Goal: G-1.2: We know
• equals(s, t) (6)
• [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) (7)
• monitor(κ, β)(er)(er’, s, s’) (8)
We show
LET b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) IN
IF b = True THEN equals(s’, t’)
ELSE ¬ equals(s’, t’) (G-1.2’)
We have two cases here
Case 1: b = True: We know
eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (10)
We show
equals(s’, t’) (G-1.2”)
We define
t’ := constructs(s’, β) (11)
We instantiate Lemma (1) with s as s’, t as t’ to get
t’ := constructs(s’, β) ⇒ equals(s’, t’) (I.7)
The goal (G-1.2”) follows from (I.7) with def. (11) and (10).
Case 2: b = False: We know
¬ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (12)
We instantiate Lemma (7) with s as s’ and get
¬ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) ⇒ eqMode(s’, ”compromised”)
(I.8)
From (I.8) with assumption (12), we know
eqMode(s’, ”compromised”) (13)
We show
¬ equals(s’, t’) (G-1.2”’)
We instantiate Lemma (2) with s as s, s’ as s’, t as t, t’ as t’,
er as er, er’ as er’, es as es, es’ as es’, κ as κ, ω as β to get
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’)
∧ equals(s, t) ∧ eqMode(s’, “compromised”)
⇒ t’ 6= constructs(s’, β) (I.9)
From (I.9), with assumptions (3), (7), (6) and (13) we get
t’ 6= constructs(s’, β) (14)
We instantiate Lemma (3) with s as s’, t as t’, ω as β to get
t’ 6= constructs(s’, β) ⇒ ¬ equals(s’, t’) (I.10)
The goal (G-1.2”’) follows from (I.10) with assumption
(14). The proof of (G-1.2’) and (G-1.2”’) implies the goal
(G-1.2’). 
Hence, the goal (G-1.2) follows from the proofs of (G-1.2.1)
and (G-1.2.2). The premise eqMode(s’, ”compromised”) of
(I.9) shows that the program execution state s’ has been
compromised.
D. Proof of the Completeness
The proof of completeness is very similar to what we have
already presented above for the soundness. However, the proof
differs only for the goal (G-1.2) whose proof is presented in
the previous subsection.
In the following, first we formulate the completeness theo-
rem:
Theorem 2 (Completeness of security monitor). The result
of the security monitor is complete for a given execution of
the target system and its specification, iff, the specification is
consistent with the program and the program executes in a
safe pre-state and in an environment that is consistent with
the environment of the specification, then
• for the pre-state of the program, there is an equivalent
safe pre-state for which the specification can be executed
and the monitor can be observed and
• if we execute the specification in an equivalent safe pre-
state and observe the monitor at any arbitrary (combined)
post-state, then
– either the program execution (post-state) is seman-
tically consistent with the specification execution
(post-state), then there is no alarm and the program
execution is safe
– or the program execution (post-state) and the spec-
ification execution (post-state) are semantically in-
consistent, then there is an alarm and the program
execution has been compromised.
Formally, completeness theorem has the following signa-
tures and definition.
Completeness ad ⊆ P(AppImpl × AppSpec × Bool)
Completeness ad(κ, ω, b) ⇔
∀ es ∈ Environments, er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, s, s’ ∈ Stater:
consistent(es, er) ∧ consistent(κ, ω) ∧
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
⇒
∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[ω]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, ω)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[ω]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧
monitor(κ, ω)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
IF equals(s’, t’) THEN
b = True ∧ b = eqMode(s’, “normal”)
ELSE b = False ∧ b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (G’)
In detail, the completeness statement says that, if
1) a specification environment (es) is consistent with a run-
time environment (er) and
2) a target system (κ) is consistent with its specification
(ω) and
3) in a given run-time environment (er), execution of the
system (κ) transforms pre-state (s) into a post-state (s’)
and
4) the pre-state (s) is safe, i.e. the state is in ”normal” mode,
then
• there is such pre- and post-states (t and t’ respectively)
and environment (es’) of specification execution such that
in a given specification environment (es), execution of the
specification (ω) transforms pre-state (t) into a post-state
(t’) and
• the pre-states s and t are equal and monitoring of the
system (κ) transforms combined pre-state (s;t) into a
combined post-state (s’;t’) and if
• in a given specification environment (es), execution of the
specification (ω) transforms pre-state (t) into a post-state
(t’) and
• the pre-states s and t are equal and monitoring of the
system (κ) transforms pre-state (s) into a post-state (s’),
then
– either the resulting two post-states s’ and t’ are
semantically equal and there is no alarm
– or the resulting two post-states s’ and t’ are semanti-
cally not equal and then the security monitor alarms.
In the following, we discuss proof of the completeness
statement.
1) Case when η = β: We can re-write (G’) as
Soundness ad(κ, β, b) ⇔
∀ es ∈ Environments, er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, s, s’ ∈ Stater:
consistent(es, er) ∧ consistent(κ, β) ∧
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
⇒
∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
IF equals(s’, t’) THEN b = True ∧ b = eqMode(s’, “normal”)
ELSE b = False ∧ b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (F’.1)
From (F’.1), we know
• consistent(es, er) (1’)
• consistent(κ, β) (2’)
• [[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) (3’)
• eqMode(s, ”normal”) (4’)
We show
• ∃ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments: equals(s, t) ∧
[[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’) (G’-1.1)
• ∀ t, t’ ∈ States, es’ ∈ Environments: equals(s, t) ∧
[[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) ∧ monitor(κ, β)(er;es)(s;t, s’;t’)
⇒
IF equals(s’, t’) THEN b = True∧b=eqMode(s’, “normal”)
ELSE b = False ∧ b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (G’-1.2)
Goal: G’-1.1: The proof is similar to as for the soundness
goal (G.1.1) as discussed in the subsection. 
Goal: G’-1.2: We know
• equals(s, t) (5’)
• [[β]](es)(es’, t, t’) (6’)
• monitor(κ, β)(er)(er’, s, s’) (7’)
We show
IF equals(s’, t’) THEN b = True ∧ b = eqMode(s’, “normal”)
ELSE b = False ∧ b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (G’-1.2’)
We have two cases here
Case 1: equals(s’, t’) holds: We know
equals(s’, t’) (8’)
We show
b = True ∧ b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (G’-1.2”)
To prove the goal, it suffices to show
eqMode(s’, ”normal) = True (G’-1.2”.1)
We instantiate Lemma (8) with s as s’ and t as t’ and get
equals(s’, t’) ⇒ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (I’.1)
The goal (G’.1.2”.1) follows from (I’.1) with assumption
(8’). Hence the goal (G’.1.2”) is proved. 
Furthermore, the goal shows that there is no alarm when
the two post-states (s’ and t’) are equivalent and are not
compromised.
Case 2: ¬ equals(s’, t’) holds: We know
¬ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (9’)
We show
b = False ∧ b = eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (G’-1.2”)
To prove the goal, it suffices to show
eqMode(s’, ”normal) = False (G’-1.2”.1)
We instantiate Lemma (9) with s as s’ and t as t’ and get
¬ equals(s’, t’) ⇒ ¬ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) (I’.3)
The goal (G’.1.2”.1) follows from (I’.3) with assumption
(9’). Hence the goal (G’.1.2”) is proved. 
Furthermore, we instantiate Lemma (7) with s as s’ to get
¬ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) ⇒ eqMode(s’, ”compromised”)
(I’.4)
From (I’.4) with the proved goal (G’.1.2”) we get
eqMode(s’, ”compromised”)
that shows that the alarm is generated when the post-states
(s’ and t’) are semantically not equal. Furthermore, from the
assumption (2’) if follows that indeed the program execution
(post-state) is compromised.
E. Auxiliary Functions and Predicates
In this section, we declare respectively define auxiliary
functions and predicates that are used in the proof of soundness
and completeness above.
• constructs : Stater × AppSpec → States
constructs(s, ω) = t,
s.t. t = build(ω) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”) ∧ abstract(s, t)
• constructs : Environmentr × AppSpec → Environments
constructs(e, ω) = e’, s.t. e’ = build(ω) ∧ abstract(e, e’)
• ; : Stater × States → State
s;t = state({〈I:v〉 ∈ store(s) : ¬∃ 〈I:v’〉 ∈ store(t)} ∪
{〈I:v’〉 ∈ store(t) : ¬∃ 〈I:v〉 ∈ store(s)} ∪
{〈I:v”〉 : ∃ v”: 〈I:v〉 ∈ store(s) ∧ 〈I:v’〉 ∈ store(t) ∧
v” = super(v, v’)}, flag(s))
• ; : Environmentr × Environments → Environment
e;e’ = environment({〈I:v〉 ∈ context(e) :
¬∃ 〈I:v’〉 ∈ context(e’)} ∪
{〈I:v’〉 ∈ context(e’) : ¬∃ 〈I:v〉 ∈ context(e)} ∪
{〈I:v”〉 :∃ v”: 〈I:v〉 ∈ context(e) ∧
〈I:v’〉 ∈ context(e’) ∧ v” = super(v, v’)}
, space(e))
• super : Valuer × Values → Value
super(v, v’) = v , if [[v]]⊆ [[v’]]
v’, if [[v’]]⊆ [[v]]
• super : EnvValr × EnvVals → EnvVal
super(v, v’) = v , if [[v]]⊆ [[v’]]
v’, if [[v’]]⊆ [[v]]
• equals ⊆ P(Stater × States)
equals(s, t) ⇔
∀ c:Components, ω:AppSpec, κ: AppImpl:
c ∈ ω ∧ c ∈ κ ∧ [[c]](er)(s, s’, er’)
⇒ [[c]](es)(t, t’, es’) ∧
∀ id: Identifiers, v: Values: 〈id, v〉 ∈ store(t)
⇒ 〈id, v’〉 ∈ store(s) ∧ abstract(v, v’)
• consistent ⊆ P(Environmentr × Environments)
consistent(er, es) ⇔
∀ id:Identifier, v: Values, v’: Valuer:
〈id, v〉 ∈ context(es) ⇒ 〈id, v’〉 ∈ context(er) ∧ abstract(v, v’)
• consistent ⊆ P(AppImpl × AppSpec)
consistent(κ, ω) ⇔ the safe execution of ”κ” meets ”ω” and ”ω”
always executes in a safe state, that can be formulated as follows:
∀ s, s’ ∈ State, e, e’ ∈ Environment:
[[κ]](e)(e’, s, s’) ∧ eqMode(s, ”normal”) ⇒ [[ω]](e)(e’, s, s’) ∧
∀ t, t’ ∈ States, d, d’ ∈ Environments:
[[ω]](d)(d’, t, t’) ∧ eqMode(t, ”normal”) ⇒ eqMode(t’, ”normal”)
Semantically, the predicate “consistent” returns True iff
only such pair of states (s and s’) are related by ”κ” which
is also related by ”ω”. Here the states and environment
are combined of two corresponding abstractions of spec-
ification and implementation respectively. Furthermore,
execution of ”ω” in a safe pre-state always yields a safe
post-state.
• abstract ⊆ P(Stater × States)
abstract(s, t) ⇔
∀ i:Identifier, v:Values:
〈i, v〉 ∈ store(t) ⇒ ∃ v’:Valuer:〈i, v’〉 ∈ store(s) ∧
abstract(v, v’)
• abstract ⊆ P(Valuer × Values)
abstract(v, v’) ⇔
∀ τ , τ ’:Type, s:Stater, t:States:
equals(s, t) ∧ [[v]](s, τ ) ∧ [[v’]](t, τ ’) ⇒ [[τ ’]]⊆ [[τ ]]
• abstract ⊆ P(EnvValr × EnvVals)
abstract(v, v’) ⇔
∀ τ , τ ’:Type, e:Environments, e’:Environmentr:
consistent(e, e’) ∧ [[v]](e, τ ) ∧ [[v’]](e’, τ ’) ⇒ [[τ ’]]⊆ [[τ ]]
F. Lemmas
In this section, we give definitions and corresponding proof
hints of lemmas that were used in the proofs above.
Lemma 1.
∀ s ∈ Stater, t ∈ States: t = constructs(s) ⇒ equals(s, t)
Lemma 2.
∀ s, s’ ∈ Stater, t, t’ ∈ States,
κ ∈ AppImpl, ω ∈ AppSpec,
er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, es, es’ ∈ Environments:
[[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’) ∧ [[ω]](es)(es’, t, t’)
∧ equals(s, t) ∧ eqMode(s’, “compromised”)
⇒ t’ 6= constructs(s’)
Proof Hints In principle, from a compromised program state,
an equivalent specification safe state cannot be constructed
because the program state may have inconsistent values for
certain variables or new variables etc.
Lemma 3.
∀ s ∈ Stater, t ∈ States: t 6= constructs(s) ⇒ ¬ equals(s, t)
Lemma 4.
∀ s, s’ ∈ State, t, t’ ∈ States,
er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, es, es’ ∈ Environments,
κ ∈ AppImpl:
[[κ]](er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) ⇔ [[κ]](er)(er’, s, s’)
Proof Hints The goal follows from the semantics of κ.
Lemma 5.
∀ s, s’ ∈ State, t, t’ ∈ States,
er, er’ ∈ Environmentr, es, es’ ∈ Environments,
ω ∈ AppSpec:
[[ω]](er;es)(er’;es’, s;t, s’;t’) ⇔ [[ω]](es)(es’, t, t’)
Lemma 6.
∀ s ∈ State, t ∈ States:
eqMode(s;t, ”normal”) ⇔ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
Lemma 7.
∀ s ∈ Stater:
¬ eqMode(s’, ”normal”) ⇔ eqMode(s’, ”compromised”)
Lemma 8.
∀ s ∈ Stater, t ∈ States: equals(s, t) ⇒ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
Proof Hint The definition of equals enables to show the goal.
Also because of the fact, that two states are only equal if they
can be constructed in a safe mode.
Lemma 9.
∀ s ∈ Stater, t ∈ States:
¬ equals(s, t) ⇒ ¬ eqMode(s, ”normal”)
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a sound and complete run-time security
monitor for application software, which avoids false alarms
(positive or negative). The monitor implements run-time soft-
ware verification, comparing an executable application speci-
fication with the execution of its implementation at run-time.
Our main contribution, the proof of soundness and complete-
ness, establishes an assume/guarantee-based contract between
the security monitor and its user, i.e. the designer of the
application to be monitored. Specifically, if the user establishes
the assumptions of the proof, then the monitor guarantees to
detect all deviations of the execution’s behaviour relatively to
the behaviour defined in the application specification and will
never produce any false alarm at run-time. Importantly, the
proof strategy can be a fundamental building block for:
1) any proof that shows that an abstract description/spec-
ification (non-determinism) of a program is consistent
with its concrete description/implementation (determin-
ism/instance),
2) transformation rules to automatically generate sound
and complete monitors (for program execution) from
specification and
3) developing proof tactics to prove such tedious goals
semi-automatically, significantly reducing human effort.
Our future work includes the mechanisation of this proof in a
proof assistant, specifically Coq, targeting the development of
a generic library based on our proof strategy so that the proof
can be applied to any given specification and implementation.
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